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OIL SPILL CLEANUP FULFILLS AIM OF FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT: Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
oil terminal operators, who use reasonable security measures, will
be reimbursed for their cleanup expenses when unknown vandals
spill oil from railroad tank cars, owned by third parties and parked
at the terminal. Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d
734 (1981).

Union Petroleum Corporation (Union) operates an oil terminal, in Revere, Massachusetts, which includes a dock extending into Chelsea Creek,
a navigable waterway, where oil tankers moor. Railroad cars enter the
terminal on a railroad spur. Union's personnel pour oil into the cars from
a loading rack, separated from Chelsea Creek by a narrow, unfenced strip
of land owned by the Boston and Main Railroad (B&M).' The terminal
operates on a 24-hour basis, and has 1000 watt mercury street lights
above the loading rack.'
Union has an "oil separator" and a spill containment system to prevent
oil from spilling into the creek. 3 Both the Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) regularly inspected the terminal and
had never found any inadequacies in Union's measures to 4contain oil
spills, nor did E.P.A. advise Union to do anything different.
On April 3, 1975, during a labor strike at the terminal, unknown vandals
entered Union's yard and discharged oil from two tank cars owned by,
1. In addition to this unfenced area, there was no fence behind a.warehouse (not owned by
Union) on the north perimeter of the terminal. Nor was there a fence for approximately 75 feet
beyond the west end of the warehouse. In place of a fence there was a large pipeline which a person
could crawl through with difficulty.
2. There were also 200-400 watt lights on the unfenced, north perimeter of the terminal. The
office building and gasoline racks in the interior of the area were also well lighted.
3. The "oil separator" is located under the railroad car loading rack. Rainwater and some oil
flow through catch basins into the separator, where the oil is separated from the water. The water
flows into Chelsea Creek and the oil remains on top and is periodically pumped out. The separator
shuts off automatically when it is overloaded.
The spill containment system is low-lying land on the loading rack side of the tracks which serves
as a containment pocket. It is lower than the land on the Chelsea Creek side of the tracks and should
have prevented oil from reaching the creek, but for unknown "ancient" wooden culverts under the
tracks owned by B&M.
4. Testimony showed that from 1964 to 1975 no vandalism which resulted in an oil spill was
ever witnessed at Union's terminal. The office building and gasoline racks in the interior of the area
were also well lighted.
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and leased to, third parties. Although seals were attached to valves on
the tank cars loaded with oil, a general practice in the industry, these
valves were not locked and were susceptible to vandalism. The discharge
amounted to about 60,000 gallons of fuel oil, part of which reached
Chelsea Creek. In accordance with the notice and cleanup provisions of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),5 Union promptly
notified the Coast Guard, a cleanup contractor, the local police and fire
departments, and the state authorities. Union paid $99,952.17 in cleanup
costs.
Union brought an action, pursuant to the FWPCA, in federal district
court seeking recovery from the United States Coast Guard for its cleanup
costs. The Coast Guard counterclaimed for the $34,862.55 it spent cleaning up the same spill.
Union argued that the purpose of the FWPCA is to "restore and main-6
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.",
To help accomplish this purpose, the Act provides that when
the owner or operator of ... an onshore facility . . . from which
oil ... is discharged in violation of subsection (b)(3) of this section
acts to remove such oil . . . in accordance with regulations promulgated pursuant to this section, such owner or operator shall be
entitled to recover the reasonable costs incurred in such removal...
upon establishing . . . that such discharge was caused solely by...
an act or omission of a third party.7
The trial court, therefore, ordered that Union be reimbursed for its cleanup
expenses. Defendants appealed, and in a per curiam opinion the United
States Court of Claims affirmed and adopted the recommendations of the
district court and dismissed the counterclaim.
In deciding whether Union could recover its cleanup expenses under
Section 1321(i)(1) of the FWPCA, the court had to determine (1) whether
Union was an "owner or operator" of a "facility," and (2) whether the
discharge was caused solely by the acts of a third party, the vandals. 8
The court construed "owner or operator" to include the person best
able to deal with the emergency. Section 1321(b)(5) of the FWPCA
provides that notice is to be given by the "person in charge of" the
facility. By deciding Union was an owner or operator, the court followed
the legislative intent of the Act, which construed the "person in charge"
as the one "operationally responsible for the . . . facility involved." 9
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i)(1) (1976).
8. The Coast Guard took the inconsistent positions that Union acted as a volunteer, because it
did not own or operate the facility from which the oil was discharged; and that Union was responsible
for the discharge.
9. Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 734, 743 n.22 (Ct. CI. 1981).
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Both the terminal and the railroad tank cars are "facilities" under the
FWPCA.'" Although the actual spill occurred from the railroad tank cars
owned by others, the court reasoned that Union's terminal was the relevant
facility because Union was in charge of the area. "To hold otherwise
would be to discourage immediate cleanup operations which is the main
thrust of the Act.""
The court recognized that a narrow interpretation of an "owner or
operator" of a "facility" would tend to frustrate the purpose of the Act
and clog the emergency process while involved parties debated who was
responsible for the cleanup.
Finally, the court held that the discharge was caused solely be the acts
of the vandals, and that Union
used reasonable care to prevent or forestall
2
those acts of vandalism.'
CONCLUSION
The decision in Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States reaffirms the
Federal judiciary's commitment to control water pollution under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Those in charge of oil terminals who
have taken reasonable precautions to prevent vandalism and oil spills into
navigable rivers will be reimbursed when vandals spill oil from tank cars
parked at the terminal. Awarding Union the full $99,952.17 encourages
other terminal operators to quickly cleanup harmful discharges into the
nation's waters.
The decision is also noteworthy for what it did not say. Union's yard
was not entirely and securely enclosed, and the terminal continued to
operate 24 hours per day under strike conditions. The court, however,
did not penalize Union for such activity. Nor did the court require Union
to take extraordinary measures to prevent oil spills from reaching Chelsea
Creek.
Further, the court did not question the accessibility of valves on railroad
tank cars. The court implicitly recognized that the general security practice
in the industry is a reasonable standard of care. Though the standard
tolerates some danger of discharge of harmful substances, this level of
industry risk remains unchanged by the decision of the Court of Claims.
MELINDA SILVER
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(10) (1976). "Onshore facility" is defined as:
[A]ny facility (including, but not limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any
kind located in, on, or under any land within the United States other than submerged
land.
I1. Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 734, 743 (1981).
12. A reasonable standard of care is the basic requirement placed on owners and operators of
facilities who wish to recover for expenses incurred cleaning up oil spills. Chicago, Minn., St.P. &
Pac. R.R. v. United States, 575 F.2d 839 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
Union's security arrangements were reasonable under strike conditions. In addition to its regular
security guard, the company assigned two police officers to patrol the terminal regularly, and stationed
two Union employees in the control shack on the night of the spill.

